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ABSTRACT
In Who Sings the Nation-State?, co-written with Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, Judith Butler identifies the paradox between the seemingly
global decline of the nation-state and the steadfast strength of its
genealogical force. According to Butler, “Arendt allows us to realise
that this may also be because the nation-state as a form was faulty
from the start.” In the first section of the article, I focus on Butler’s
analysis of Israel/Palestine as a failed nation-state and seek to identify
its faulty start. I propose that the nation has been masked by the race-
religion constellation in the creation of the Westphalian race-state and
identify this as the “faulty start” of the nation-state in European history.
The term “race-religion constellation” refers to the connection or co-
constitution of the categories of race and “religion” and the practice of
classifying people into races according to categories we now associate
with the term “religion.” I contend that it is this genealogical force of the
nation that frames Israel/Palestine, whichwas, and is, Europe’s offspring,
and at times its prodigal son. In the third and final section I discuss
alternatives to the nation-state by means of the notion of diasporic
political communities, as taken up by Butler and Paul Gilroy respectively,
to assess what such communities can provide instead of the exclusion-






In an interview with Udi Aloni in 2011, Judith Butler stated: “My politics, my life, even my
feminism is about calling into question whether those ideas of femininity are necessary, and if
I don’t fall into these categories . . . what social place is there forme?”1 It is this last question that
discloses the thematic thread connecting Butler’s analysis of gender, performativity, grievability,
and her critique of the state of Israel. Where do I belong? How does my belonging affect the
other? Can I be and feel at home in the world without violating myself or the other? Butler’s
commitment, in her philosophy as in her political activism, has been to challenge categories
that deny inclusion, belonging, or “a social place.” As Colby Dickinson and Silas Morgan have
written, “Butler has taken up a sort of ‘exilic’ position vis-à-vis various communities, academic,
social, political and religious alike, exhibiting her willingness . . . to join together with other
voices in a shared quest for justice.”2 Throughout her writing, the “I” asking this question has
shifted from a person who refuses the script of heteronormativity to a Palestinian refugee
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whose body is not acknowledged as grievable or, more recently, to her own voice as a Jewwho
rejects the racist policies of the State of Israel. While the “I” has changed, the relevance of the
question has (sadly) not changed, which leads me to ask: how, if at all, are these, and many
other, binary exclusions that prevent the “I” from belonging, interrelated? What, if any, are the
alternatives to these exclusions?
A year after this interview, in Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism, Butler
explored the principle of Jewishness, of cohabitation, as an alternative form of belonging for
Israelis and Palestinians. Its political ethic is a direct response to all the “Eichmanns” in the
world who “think” that they can choose with whom they want to share this earth.3 In other
words, Butler’s political ethics of relationality rejects the basic and exclusionary binary that
undergirds all forms of racism—the Fanonian binary of being and non-being.4 On one side
are those whose privilege (rooted in a belief of supremacy) or white innocence creates and
upholds the structural and psycho-social conditions that mark certain bodies as human,
grievable, and non-superfluous, and others as non-beings, which she developed in dialogue
with Michel Foucault and Frantz Fanon in her second 2016 Tanner Lecture, “Legal Violence:
An Ethical and Political Critique.”5 In Israel today, Palestinians whether as refugees (in camps
or in diasporic communities) or as second-class citizens, are forced to inhabit zones of non-
being, much like the Jews did in Europe in the past and many Muslims do today in Europe.6
While Butler’s recent focus is on Israel/Palestine and the BDS movement, her analysis is
equally relevant to questions of the nation-state and racism in Europe (and indirectly to all
the spaces it has colonised). These exclusionary binaries, whether citizen/refugee, Israeli/
Palestinian, European/Other, are not accidental creations nor are they unrelated. By referring
to Israel as Europe’s prodigal son, or as its offspring, I claim that the current state of Israel
embraces the Greek/Ulysses paradigm of the nation-state of homogeneity/assimilation
which explicitly devalues diasporic Jewish life and values and further dehumanises
Palestinians. The alternatives Butler explores, such as the notion of Jewishness and cohabi-
tation, may be significant for understanding not only the failure of Europe’s “Middle Eastern
offspring” but also for understanding current-day Europe itself.
In the first section, I focus on Butler’s analysis of Israel-occupied Palestine in relation to
the failure of the nation-state. Butler had previously noted that “Arendt allows us to realise
that this [failure] may also be because the nation-state as a form was faulty from the
start.”7 The question I address is: What is it about the nation-state that, according to
Arendt and Butler, makes its start faulty? To answer this question, I seek in the second
section to go beyond Butler, who does not consider Europe’s role, past or present, in
creating and sustaining this anti-democratic political community, by considering the
European origins of this “faulty start.” I wish to argue that the role of the race-religion
constellation in the creation of the Westphalian race-state has been masked by the notion
of the nation, and that it is this constellation that is the “faulty start” both in Europe and in
Israel. Finally, I consider two alternatives to the nation-state both of which are forms of
diasporic political communities: Butler’s notion of Jewishness and Paul Gilroy’s notion of
the changing same.
Occupation
In their 2007 dialogue Who Sings the Nation-State, Judith Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak discussed the nation-state, belonging, language, and power. It is of course no
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surprise that their conversation was very much guided by the thought of Hannah Arendt.
In their dialogue Butler noted the paradox of the apparent global decline of the nation-
state and the steadfastness of its genealogical force. While there may be fewer nation-
states across the globe, the logic that led to the creation of nation-states remains ever
present. In her more recent speeches and writings, and especially in Parting Ways, Butler
explores this “genealogical force” in relation to the case of the Jewish (and “democratic”)
state of Israel. In her analysis of Israel as a failed nation-state, Butler considers its form,
which, following Arendt, she claims was faulty from the start.
In her February 2013 speech at Brooklyn College on the Boycott, Divestment and
Sanctions (BDS) movement (delivered with its founder Omar Barghouti), Butler succinctly
presented her position on Israel, arguing that it was not possible for Israel to be both
a Jewish nation and a democratic state, as it claimed it was. “The state of Israel should be
representing all of its population equally, regardless of whether or not they are Jewish,
regardless of race, religion or ethnicity.”8 By prioritising its Jewish citizens (and in parti-
cular its European or Ashkenzi Jewish citizens9), Israel cannot maintain its democratic
guarantee of treating all citizens equally. Butler develops her critique in a way that
connects it to her work on binaries and categories:
In my view, we have to remain critical of anyone who posits a single norm that decides rights
of entry into the social or cultural category determining as well who will be excluded. Most
categories of identity are fraught with conflicts and ambiguities; the effort to suppress the
complexity of the category of “Jewish” is thus a political move that seeks to yoke a cultural
identity to a specific Zionist position.10
She finds the fixing of “Jewish” identity to a particular violent ideology problematic. It
repudiates the possibility of a political ethics of relationality and serves to justify an
exclusionary category—preventing the “I” from finding its social place, from
belonging.11 In her speech, Butler referred to the approximately 25% of Israel’s population
that is not Jewish, most of whom are Palestinians:
If Israel is to be considered a democracy, the non-Jewish population deserves equal rights
under the law, as do the Mizrachim (Arab Jews) who represent over 30 percent of the
population. Presently, there are at least twenty laws that privilege Jews over Arabs within
the Israeli legal system. The 1950 Law of Return grants automatic citizenship rights to Jews
from anywhere in the world upon request, while denying that same right to Palestinians who
were forcibly dispossessed of their homes in 1948 or subsequently as the result of illegal
settlements and redrawn borders.12
Unlike 76% of Israelis who believe Israel can be both a Jewish and democratic state,13
Butler does not believe that a state that systematically, legally, and structurally privi-
leges a part of its population can be called democratic, since creating an internal racial
or ethnic hierarchy is fundamentally opposed to the egalitarian and inclusive principle
of a democracy. Given the current controversy concerning the working definition of
anti-Semitism in Europe, and the confusion it causes by reducing critique of the State of
Israel to a form of anti-Semitism, it is essential to separate legitimate critique of the state
of Israel from anti-Semitism. When criticising the state of Israel as a failed democracy, we
must also acknowledge that an ideal democracy doesn’t exist anywhere. Nonetheless,
we cannot allow this fact to prevent us from stating that the state of Israel was
“established” in 1948—at a time when the world was not naïve about the dangers of
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an exclusionary state. Not only in Israel, but also in the partition of India, the largest
groups of global refugees (until then) were created. Many Jews, especially among
intellectuals who wrote about this, because of their experience as refugees during the
Shoah, were fully aware of the dangers of explicitly prioritising one people (nation) at
the expense of another. That such prioritisation was legally permitted by the UN, in full
awareness of its role and responsibility in the creation of yet another refugee crisis, is
thus particularly problematic.
The second point Butler raises, which will be explored further in terms of her notion of
Jewishness, is that the state of Israel, and in particular its political Zionist ideology, does not
represent all Jews. What she is specifically referring to here is the Jewish diaspora (just over
50% of the world’s Jewish population), and its exilic ethical tradition, which she affirms as
positive (as opposed to its negation by political Zionism). The highly problematic reduction of
Jewishness to Zionism, promoted by the state ideology, is not only anti-democratic, according
to Butler, it is also anti-Jewish in that it rejects diasporic or Rabbinic Judaism, the very
foundation of Jewish ethics she seeks to empower. She explains that her support for the
BDS stems from the fact that it upholds the principle of exilic Judaism, a form of plurality that
promotes cohabitation and the end to the unjust privileging of Jews over Palestinians.14
Butler’s normative claim is that a democratic state cannot prioritise a particular group of
people, or nation. However, in the case of Israel this nation is religiously defined. While it is not
clear if this religious definition poses additional problems for Butler, it is significant in relation
to the creation of the Westphalian nation-state, which was also religiously bound.15 While
Butler declares that any non-egalitarian citizenship that is restricted on a religious basis, as in
Israel, is an obstacle to emancipation—the broader political issue is the link between nation
and state. In PartingWays, she turns to the concept of binationalism in order to deconstruct the
concept of a nation. Binationalism does not have a pre-determined form but calls for the
followingminimal criteria to bemet: (1) an end to (settler) colonial rule; (2) the social and legal
equality of all inhabitants; and (3) a polity that is inclusive towards all inhabitants in full
recognition of their alterity (rather than being blind to difference as the liberal state is
presumed to be).16 Only if the concept of a nation is decoupled from that of the state, which
would be impossible in the proposed two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, does
she see any hope of creating an egalitarian and inclusive democratic polity. It is thus the very
fact that Israel was created as a Jewish nation-state that makes its start “faulty” according to
Butler.
To understand this “fault” in broader terms, Butler turns to Arendt, who demonstrated
how the nation-state, because it prioritises a particular “nation,” leads to the exclusion and
expulsion of others, who all too often become dehumanised refugees. Referring to
Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism, Butler reminds us that the state of Israel was meant
to solve Europe’s post-Shoah “Jewish question.” Since, even after the Shoah, the fraction
of Jews that survived were not welcome in Europe, perhaps because they were a material
reminder of Europe’s shame, the colonization of Palestine appeared to be the proper
solution. Sadly, according to Arendt, this
solved neither the problem of the minorities nor the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually all
other events of our century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a new
category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of the stateless and right-less
by another 700 000 to 800 000 people.17
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Arendt demonstrates how nineteenth-century states required homogeneity to establish
and maintain “the nation” and thus could not possibly accommodate plurality or differ-
ence. Accordingly, the fault at the heart of the nation-state is the assumption that political
community requires homogeneity, which comes in the form of nationhood or national-
ism. The tragedy she identifies at the heart of the nation-state is that it cannot sustain
itself without excluding others. She describes in excruciating detail how this process
occurred in the past, the resurgence of which we are witnessing today. There are at
present almost 70 million unwanted refugees (officially 26 million, with 4 million applying
for asylum, and 40 million internally displaced persons), most of whose names, stories and
identities are erased by being reduced to numbers.
In the case of the Shoah, the Nazi definition of nation (and linked to the state) was
Aryanism or, in its exclusionary form, non-Aryans (which included Jews, Roma/Sinti,
Slavs, Asocials, LGBTM etc.). In this case the nation-state can appropriately be redefined
as the race-state. Anti-Semitism, according to Arendt, and racism more broadly, accord-
ing to Butler, continues to have a genealogical force and continues to be the foundation
of nation-states. Racism denies the basic fact of human plurality, and is constructed by
way of a dynamic human/non-human (or less than human) binary. How this binary
operates is clarified, among others, by Arendt’s analysis of the processes of
dehumanisation.
The Race-Religion Constellation
In Parting Ways, published in 2012, Butler takes up Arendt’s analysis of dehumanisation
and applies it to Israel. To sustain its faulty start Israel requires a citizenship law that is
fundamentally anti-democratic, in addition to many other racist and exclusionary laws.18
I want to go beyond Butler and Arendt by turning to European (conceptual) history to
explore the origins of this faulty start in the race-state and in many other anti-democratic
political communities. My contention is that the faulty start, in Europe, Israel, and many
other former European colonies, lies in the race-religion constellation which has been
masked by the notion of the nation in the creation of theWestphalian state, and is masked
today by the discourse of Europe’s “Judeo-Christian” myth or that of (post)-secularism.19
Racism, which has worn many masks across time and space, provides the “justification” for
a rejection of plurality or cohabitation. Once unmasked this fundamental connection
between the nation-state and racism results in what may be called the race-state.20 It does
so by denying the basic fact of plurality, creating zones of non-being and determining
who should inhabit them. Its alternative proclaims that we all belong to a shared world,
with our differences, which should be the basis of our social bonds as opposed to the
“naturalised” category of race that has been racialised in the name of the nation-state. As
Butler puts it in Parting Ways,
[t]his means that unwilled proximity and unchosen cohabitation are preconditions of our
political existence, which is the basis of her [Arendt’s] critique of the nation-state (and its
presumption of a homogeneous nation), and implies the obligation to live on earth and in
a polity that establishes modes of equality for a necessarily heterogeneous population. (24)
In order to prove this, we turn to the European origins of the nation-state. An early answer
to the question of what forms a political community and what binds its members, which
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greatly influenced the Westphalian paradigm, was given by Jean Bodin (1529–96), who
argued that exclusion was key to the creation of a political community. The historical
context of his claim were the fifteenth-century struggles about true religion when Europe
was supposedly transitioning from the “Dark Ages” towards a more Enlightened and
scientific world-view. Prior to the Reformation, the term vera religio (true religion) was
synonymous with the Catholic Church and Christianity (or Christendom). All Christians
had souls (the majority of men living in Europe); while Christian women were a “border”
population;21 and all non-Christians (the minority) did not, and as such would be damned.
These theological and political conflicts, which were at the centre of the struggle between
the Catholic Church and the Protestant Reformers in the seventeenth century,22 and led
to the death of over 10 million people, symbolised the exclusionary binary between
humans and non-humans, which is central to all forms of racism.23
The solution to these violent conflicts was first conceived at the 1555 Peace of
Augsberg which established the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his
religion). Augsburg thus symbolises the faulty start of the nation-state—where nation is
defined by one’s religion, which of course was fundamentally linked to one’s soul and
humanity. This political peace, which created sovereign states with distinct theological-
political constellations, enabled many of the non-Catholic denominations of Christianity
to be accepted, at least in theory, as forms of true religion. Non-Christians were most often
viewed as heathens, barbarians, uncivilised and lesser beings. The view propagated in
Europe among theologians, whose political influence was still strong, was that non-
Christians had a false “religion” and those in the Americas had “no religion,” both cases
being inferior to Christians and possibly non-human.24
This new definition of political community was formally institutionalised at the Peace
of Westphalia in 1648, which led to the structuring of new states in the form of nation-
states which shared an imaginary “naturalised bond.”25 In other words, the bond of
religion was racialised to justify why certain groups could not inhabit/cohabit the earth.
This exclusionary “religious” binary is the origin of the race-religion constellation. Now, the
contemporary secularised myth of the formation of states tries to deny the fact that, at its
inception, the Westphalian nation-state was a religion-based racialised state. The original
binary, now masked by the discourse of secularism, is the foundation of the complex
category of “religion,” which according to Butler, with reference to the work of Saba
Mahmood and Talal Asad, among others, cannot be spoken of as simply a non-
problematic non-constructed category (like all binaries).26 She acknowledges that the
concept of “religion” is linked to the rise of Protestantism and the privatisation/interna-
lisation of belief/faith. Likewise, she acknowledges, following Arendt, that Jewishness
should not been equated with Judaism, as the latter refers to a “religious” praxis.27
However, by the time of the French Revolution, when all things religious were chal-
lenged, these categories and their exclusionary binary were partially replaced by
a philological classification system. The rise of the “new science” of philology was largely
the result of the scientific developments of modernity and also played a central role in the
founding mythologies of many new states.28 As national communities throughout Europe
sought to differentiate and unify themselves, shared cultural bonds—in which language
played a critical role—became of primary importance.29 This categorical shift was the first
of many changes that signalled a movement away from “religion” towards science and
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secularism, which translated and naturalised the hierarchical classification of religious
categories. This is the first step in the masking of the race-religion constellation.
Although they claimed to be scientific and free of theological influence, the new
philological categories incorporated the previous “religious” categories. Exemplary of
this incorporation was the term “Semite.” According to philologists, people could be
classified as Semitic, Aryan, or Turanian. These categories began to gain popularity around
the 1840s.30 Both the category and its appellation were fashioned by the previously
dominant religious categories. First used in 1781 by the German Orientalist August
Schlözer, the term ‘Semite’ comes from Shemite in relation to the three languages spoken
by Shem’s sons (Noah’s grandsons): Arabic, Aramaic, and Hebrew.31 Schlözer relied on
a popular classification of the world’s peoples based on which of Noah’s three sons they
descended from. Ham’s descendants are cursed because their father, Ham, sees his
inebriated father, Noah, naked. Their curse, to be the “lowest of slaves” (Genesis 9:25),
was linked to the phenotype of darker skin as a sign of inferiority. This “curse” was used to
“justify” much of the barbarity of colonialism, especially by those who saw their Christian
mission as one of “civilising” the African continent. Shem, the second son, depicted as
“Oriental,” was the father of the Semites and settled in what would today be the Middle
East, a border people. Japheth, the white son, with whom Europeans identified, was
associated with Aryanism (which included parts of Asia) and European civilisation, as the
name means to expand (or enlarge)—an association used to justify missionary activities
and colonialism. These religious categories were thus reconfigured in terms of philologi-
cal distinctions (e.g., Semites, Aryans) to create naturalised bonds whether of language,
culture or history, and were eventually translated into the biological category of “race”
which we associate with racism.32
The point of revealing the constitutive role religion-cum-racial categories play in the
foundation and maintenance of the Westphalian state is to show that from its inception it
created “racialised” others. This constellation continues to manifest itself in Israel, Europe’s
offspring as noted (uncritically) by Arendt, who internalised and thus normalised this
European racism, as seen in her letter to Karl Jaspers in which she described the court-
room of Eichmann’s trial:
My first impression. On top, the judges, the best of German Jewry. Below them, the persecut-
ing attorneys, Galicians, but still Europeans. Everything is organized by a police force that
gives me the creeps, speaks only Hebrew and looks Arabic. Some downright brutal types
among them. They would follow any order. And outside, the oriental mob, as if one were in
Istanbul or some other half-Asiatic country. In addition, and very visible in Jerusalem, the
peies and caftan Jews, who make life impossible for all the reasonable people here.33
In the case of Israel, both in the 1960s and now, this racism has both internal Jewish
distinctions (Ashkenazim, Sephardim, etc.), as well as Jewish/non-Jewish (Palestinian,
Christian, etc.), which are analogous to the distinction used in the Westphalian nation-
state in the seventeenth century. In this sense, Europe’s post-Shoah offspring (i.e., Israel) is
a mirror held up to the realities and conflicts of Europe—both then and now. While much
can be said about the workings of the race-religion constellation, both in Europe and in
Israel/occupied Palestine, the fundamental concern—which Butler addresses specifically
with regard to the latter—is the exclusionary logic of the social bond of the Westphalian
race-state that is based on a quasi-natural bond between people. By creating others, by
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naturalising constructed categories, the racist nation-state excludes whatever other it
refuses to cohabit with. It prevents different groups from participating, from contesting
and challenging the structure of the exclusionary system.34 This exclusion is so deeply
embedded that the excluded others often internalise their difference and accept that to
be included they must assimilate—a process that is in fact impossible as their difference is
“natural” and thus seemingly fixed or irreversible.
Diasporic Political Communities
What, then, are the alternatives to the nation-state? What most of the alternatives—such
as deterritorialized nation-states, ethnoscapes, cosmopolitics, borderlands—have in com-
mon is that they call into question the supposedly natural or historical bond that creates
a community.35 In the final chapter of The Racial State, David Goldberg states:
So what sort of state best represents the commitments of heterogeneities, demographically
and culturally, politically and economically, socially and legally? What, in short, might be the
shape of contemporary and future states, their principal modes of rule and representation,
their social contours and lines of governance in the absence of and resistance to racist
formation and in the aftermath of homogenizing logics?36
This is the question both Butler and Gilroy address in conceptualising diasporic political
communities as a means to go beyond the nation-state. By examining the tensions,
resonances and potential of their respective diasporic imaginings, I explore what alter-
native diasporic political communities can provide in place of the exclusionary racist
binary that is the faulty start and sadly the power of the nation-state.
For both Arendt and Butler, the alternatives are to be found in forms of polity that are
open to plurality. Arendt explored several such options throughout her life. She consid-
ered the federation, where no single “nation” has absolute sovereignty, which raises the
question of what differentiates one polity from another? Is there any sense in having
borders and distinct states in this model? While Arendt was cautious about explicitly
rejecting the state, which at present is the only guarantor of rights for those who belong
to the nation, her proposal nonetheless refuses a system that only provides rights for an
exclusive group. This is what Arendt means when she refers to the right to have rights, the
right to belong, to be at home in the world. Nonetheless, Arendt holds on to the idea of
“nations” as spaces of belonging, but as not linked to sovereign states with the power to
exclude. What is clear to her is that democracy is incompatible with sovereignty. The
former is based on inclusion, while the latter exerts its authority by means of exclusion. As
Butler notes in Parting Ways, “Arendt could conceive of the Jews as a nation only as long
as that national status did not give them sovereign power to decide with whom to govern
the state, that is, a nation without a nation-state, a nation that could constitute a sphere of
belonging within a polity structured as a federated plurality” (146).
By engaging in a dialogue with Edward Said, Emmanuel Levinas, Walter Benjamin,
Arendt, Primo Levi, and Mahmoud Darwish (one could say, a “Semitic” dialogue between
the children of Shem who perhaps have epistemic privilege as a border people), Butler
proposes an alternative to the nation-state through her notion of Jewishness as the
principle that affirms diasporic (galut/exilic) Judaism. This proposal, however, does not
acknowledge the importance of the physical Eretz Israel where Judaism was born and
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shaped. Butler’s affirmation challenges part of the Zionist ideology, promoted by the state
of Israel, that refuses to recognise the richness of diasporic Judaism. This is somewhat
ironic as orthodox Judaism is a form of Rabbinic Judaism, which developed after the
destruction of the Second Temple, that is, within the Jewish diaspora.37
In January 2015, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris, Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu appealed to European Jews to emigrate to Israel (to make Aliyah),
based on the racist 1950 Law of Return which allows Jews to become Israeli citizens, which
right is denied to many Palestinians who were born in lands occupied by Israel. He thus
implicitly defined diasporic Judaism as a “fallen” or secondary form of Judaism. Butler
rightly reminds her readers that her Judaism and that of more than half of world Jewry,
whether in terms of ethics or religious praxis, affirms the ethics of diaspora Judaism that
she defines as the principle of Jewishness or cohabitation. Jewishness rejects the view
that Jews belong in Israel, that belonging requires unity and homogeneity, or a nation. By
focusing on Jews “returning” to Israel, a place many Jews have neither been to nor have
had any connection to over the past 2000 years (except in prayer references to Zion),
political Zionism reduces Judaism to a limited and problematic notion of “return.” What
Butler reminds us is that perhaps there is an alternative to the ideology of return, to the
ideology of the nation-state that leads to exclusion, dehumanisation and the production
of refugees.
While Butler does not refer to Levinas in making this claim, it is worth doing so, as
Levinas affirms this alternative as the “essence” of Judaism without Butler’s political
commitments. In “The Trace of the Other” he writes: “To the myth of Ulysses returning
to Ithaca we wish to oppose the story of Abraham who leaves his fatherland forever for
a yet unknown land, and forbids his servant to even bring back his son to the point of
departure.”38 According to Levinas, it is the ancient “Greek”way to focus on a return to the
same. By contrast, the Jewish way, following Abraham, is to leave, to live with the
unknown other, and not to be obsessed, as Ulysses was, with the return home. This is
the basis of Levinas’s ethics of alterity, an ethics of the other that rejects sameness/return.
And I base my referring to Israel as Europe’s prodigal son, or its true offspring, precisely on
this distinction. But why does Levinas, like so many others, refuse to acknowledge this?
Butler poses this question in Parting Ways by citing Levinas’s words from Difficult Freedom:
“Zionism and the creation of the State of Israel mean for Jewish thought a return to
oneself in every sense of the term, and the end of an alienation that lasted a thousand
years” (42). By basing its Zionist political ideology on return, and by explicitly and implicitly
devaluing diasporic Jewish life, and sameness, by making non-Ashkenazi Jews secondary
citizens and dehumanising Palestinians—the state of Israel embraces the Greek/Ulysses
paradigm of the nation-state of homogeneity/assimilation. How can Levinas justify this
Jewish/Zionist exceptionalism, embracing return and rejecting his ethics of alterity?
Levinas’s failure to apply his own ethics to the Israel-Palestinian context, his view of
Palestinians as “faceless” and as inhabiting a zone of non-being, is not lost on Butler
(38). She finds solace and hope in Said, who appreciates “the importance of sustaining
a diasporic condition for a new polity, one in which identity never fully returns to
itself, where identity remains cast out in a web of relations [Arendt] that cannot
eradicate difference or return to simple identity?” (50–51). Because Levinas’s ethics
embraces an alternative paradigm to the homogeneity of the race-state, but his
politics does not, Butler explores political alternatives, whether those symbolised by
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Abraham, mixity, cohabitation or Jewishness, in the work of other thinkers such as
Arendt, Levi, Darwish, and Said. The most promising in this respect is Said’s notion of
mixity or impurity as a way of belonging in the diaspora39 (which she also sees as
embracing Levinas’s actual ethics), as it asks “whether that idea of an ethics of alterity
—an alterity that is built into the identity itself—can become a basis for a new
political vision” (217).
It is important to note that this new political vision rejects the faulty logic of the nation-
state. Butler claims that life in the diaspora, among non-Jews, led to a different kind of
ethos. She is honest enough to recognise that this ethos has two faces. On the one land,
living as the outsider/other can lead to fear, anxiety, and paranoia (which she doesn’t
connect to Arendt’s parvenu, the depoliticised relation to the other as protector rather
than partner). On the other hand, living with others—with difference—can force us to
actually think about what kind of ethos is necessary to be at home with the alterity within
us and between people:
How do you live in a world that is truly mixed racially, mixed religiously? Where you live next
to someone you never chose? Where you come up against people from various backgrounds?
Where there is not necessarily a common background or common understanding? That
struck me as the non-separatist tradition in Judaism that I valued and that I sought to
continue. So, in a way, my politics are profoundly diasporic. (215)
The alternative Butler proposes acknowledges the plurality that is the factual reality of the
twenty-first century rather than trying to return to the nation-state in which nations are
organised according to exclusionary categories such as race and religion. It is, in other
words, the ethos “forced” upon the Jews in the diaspora which promoted cohabitation
with others with whom one doesn’t necessarily share “common” or “naturalised”
qualities.40 Butler thus argues for a notion of identity that welcomes alterity and allows
for difference to belong and be at home within the self. Analogous to the creation of
space for alterity in ipseity, is the call to create space for difference in the world. Her claim
is not normative, that we shouldmake space for alterity, but rather pragmatic and rational.
Plurality is the reality, and we cannot escape it. No walls or borders can really prevent
contact with difference, which both surrounds us and is within us. In Arendtian terms,
cohabitation cannot be seen as a choice.
What makes this problem more specific and directly links Israel to its European patrons
or founders, is the use of a religious category to demarcate racial exclusion in its definition
of itself as a nation. This is precisely what we must avoid according to the lesson Arendt’s
analysis of Eichmann highlights. We cannot seek to establish unity/sameness by means of
the elimination of difference.41
For Arendt one reason why genocide is radically impermissible is that we have no
choice with whomwe cohabit the earth. A diverse population always precedes us; and it is
always plural, multilingual, and spatially distributed. No group or community can claim
the earth for itself (24). But when one group does so, it adheres to the logic of racialisation
—whether tied to a nation, a religion, a culture, biology or skin-colour. However, once
these exclusionary categories are enforced they create seemingly naturalised bonds.42 As
such, racism is the rejection of plurality, the fact that we must all share the earth.
While Gilroy approaches the conceptualisation of diaspora from the perspective of the
Black Atlantic, his goals as well as sources are similar to Butler’s in her conceptualisation of
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Jewishness.43 As he writes: “The term diaspora identifies a relational network, characteris-
tically produced by forced dispersal and reluctant scattering.”44 Likewise, he condemns the
diverse causes of the dispersion of peoples (e.g., war, poverty, oppression, colonialism,
capitalism, slavery) but not necessarily all of its after effects.45 The latter can ideally lead to
an opening up of one’s “culture,” a claim that both Said and Butler affirm. “Diaspora as
a concept,” he writes, “therefore, offers new possibilities for understanding identity, not as
something inevitably determined by place or nationality, and for visualizing a future where
new bases for social solidarity are offered and joined.”46 Gilroy refers to the alternative
bonds in terms of forms of belonging that are not linked to fixed roots, territories or stable
boundaries. In this vein, he explores the idea of movement as a challenge to the powerful
metaphors of soil and blood.47 The strongest resonance in their respective conceptualisa-
tions of diasporic imaginings relates to diasporic identity-formations.
Like Butler, Gilroy is interested in an ethical or political episteme that potentially arises
from a diasporic experience.48 This diasporic consciousness or awareness ideally leads to
an alternative type of identity:
The reproduction of a diaspora consciousness, in which identity is focused less on the
equalizing, proto-democratic force of common territory and more on the social dynamics
of remembrance and commemoration defined by a strong sense of the dangers involved in
forgetting the location of origin and the process of dispersal.49
With regard to the question of origins or of return, it is clear that Butler and Gilroy differ.
While Butler explicitly rejects this possibility, because the manifestation of its possibility
destroys this ethic, Gilroy keeps this possibility open. In this vein, his conceptualisation has
more potential as it must be conceivable to maintain a diasporic consciousness without
remaining dispersed. He also adds, referring to James Baldwin’s refusal to be identified as
a victim (either because of his skin-colour or sexual orientation), that this consciousness
has its own pitfalls of becoming fixed rather than embracing its relationality. Evidence of
this pitfall can be found in the national ethos in Israel which defines it as the permanent
victim, and thus incapable of perpetrating crimes against Palestinians. Butler identifies
this pitfall in Levinas’s essentialisation of the Jews who become “the model and instance
for this preontological persecution” (46); the eternal victims incapable of transcending the
binary and being both victims and perpetrators.
While clearly defined in reaction to the limitations of identity formation imposed by the
race-state, Gilroy takes us further than Butler with regard to the “content,” the changing
same, of a diasporic identity. “Consciousness of diaspora affiliation stands opposed to the
distinctly modern structures and modes of power orchestrated by the institutional com-
plexity of nation states.”50 For Gilroy, the concept and consciousness of diaspora allows
one to challenge the so-called natural bonds of the “race”-state. Diasporic imaginings are
fundamentally anti-essentialist and can never be fixed. And yet they are also not acci-
dental or always changing. To capture this Gilroy refers to Leroi Jones’s 1967 notion of the
changing same;51 “the same is retained without needing to be reified.”52
While neither Butler nor Gilroy thematises the notion of impurity, its connection to
diasporic imaginings critical of the race-state is not accidental. The birth of the nation-
state in Europe, whether one dates it to 1555, 1648 or the eighteenth century, is connected
to the desire for a pure homogenous national religious community (for Catholics a state free
of Protestants and vice versa, without even considering the “impurity” of non-Christian
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races). It is also worth noting that these events resulted in the first wave of “religious”
refugees in Europe—the Huguenots, the French Protestants, who were born in a Catholic
territory that did not tolerate their beliefs/practices and were thus forced to seek refuge
elsewhere. The link between purity and homogeneity has its roots in the Christian heritage
of European nation-states, a political-theological desire that was violently enforced in all
colonised lands. As an alternative to this, Butler and Gilroy posit a racial impurity that is
treasured rather than destroyed:
Against this choice stands another, more difficult option: the theorisation of creolisation,
metissage, mestizaje, and hybridity. From the viewpoint of ethnic absolutism, this would be
a litany of pollution and impurity. These terms are rather unsatisfactory ways of naming the
processes of cultural mutation and restless (dis)continuity that exceed racial discourse and
avoid capture by its agents.53
Diasporic imaginations destabalise and challenge the need for the purity and homoge-
neity of fixed notions of identity.
By way of conclusion, I want to stress that, while Butler asks us to go beyond the nation-
state to combat the political reality of refugees, it is Gilroy whomakes clear that this challenge
to the nation-state will also be a direct challenge to racism. However, the nation-state is the
lynchpin of the neo-liberal Western powers. Diasporic imaginings offer an alternative ideal of
political community that is not defined in terms of an exclusionary binary. Rather than desire
purity, homogeneity, roots, and fixed identities, diasporic imaginations offer impurity, hetero-
geneity, various routes and non-binary identities. While my focus here has been on the racial
nation-state, it is clear that diasporic groups also internalise the racism that these states feed
off. As such it is not only the race-state that needs to be dismantled.
Gilroy believes that diasporic imaginations have the potential to challenge both the
structures of power and their internalisation. This seems almost too good to be true.
Homogeneity and purity are not only necessary myths for creating the race-state, they
also serve to internally destabilise excluded groups by forcing them into a “one-size fits
all” mode.54 This serves to promote the idea that there is homogeneity where there isn’t,
as well as setting up a classical divide-and-conquer-catch-22 situation between different
excluded groups fighting for recognition. As W.E.B. Du Bois reminds us, “race” is a dynamic
concept: if we are to challenge it we must not reduce it to a static binary.55 And yet this
reduction is precisely what its different manifestations in the nation-state enable. The
race-state is perhaps best envisioned as Cerberus, the three-headed dog that guards the
underworld. However, the race-state isn’t the hound of Hades, it is the hound of white
supremacy. As long as we do not go beyond the nation-state, we will continue to live in
a world with a growing refugee population, rampant racism, and injustice. The diasporic
imaginings of Butler and Gilroy, among others, are hopefully a small step in the right
direction of its eventual dismantling and transformation into what will eventually be more
humane political communities.
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